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American consumers, like the consumers of all nations, have an immense
stake in the minerals of the deep seabed. "Deep seabed," of course, refers to the
areas seaward of the limits of national seabed jurisdiction, whether these limits
are assumed to be the continental shelf, the continental margin, or a 200-mile
zone. The minerals of immediate interest are, as all of us exposed to the subject
know, the hard minerals found in the so-called manganese nodules. The nodules
themselves are strange potato-shaped little pieces of rock scattered over
thousand of square miles of seabed, under 12,000 to 20,000 feet of water. They
contain a score or more of minerals, but the ones of greatest value, taking into
account their relative percentages in the ore, are manganese, copper, nickel and
cobalt.
Again, as is commonly known, these four minerals are essential to American
industry. They are of immense present concern to American consumers because
we are dependent for all of them on foreign sources, many of them politically
undependable.
We now import 100 percent of our manganese, 88 percent of our nickel, 100
percent of our cobalt, 20 percent of our copper. Over 90 percent of those
imports originate in nine countries. Our current supplies are thus vulnerable to
price-fixing and curtailment through cartels, governmental and private. OPEC
has taught a lesson, not only to us but also to these nine dominant hard-mineral
producing countries. The Assembly of the United Nations, in its "Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States," in 1974, spelled out this lesson. It
pontificated:
All states have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity pro-
ducers in order to develop their national economies, to achieve stable financing for
their development and, in pursuance of their aims, to assist in the promotion of sus-
tained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating the development of
developing countries. Correspondingly all States have the duty to respect the right by
refraining from applying economic and political measures that would limit it.
Translated, this means that the consumers of the world not only must accept
price fixing by more OPECs; it is unlawful for them to dislike it. So says the
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United Nations. Quite naturally, of the nine countries that I mentioned, not one
joined the United States in voting against the resolution containing this charter.
Cartels, in various degrees of maturity, now exist among producers of
petroleum, copper, iron ore, bauxite, tin, cadmium, mercury, phosphate rock,
and tungsten. The yellow pages will soon bulge with more.
This brings us to the importance of preserving American access to the
minerals of the deep seabed: American companies have developed the tech-
nology to recover the manganese nodules, lift them to the surface, transport
them to on-shore refineries, process them, and recover their metals, on an
economic basis. This is our last great reserve of key minerals, free of control by
other nations. The United States Department of the Interior has estimated that
by 1990 the United States can totally eliminate all imports of nickel, copper,
and cobalt, and can reduce imports of manganese to 23 percent of
consumption, provided that the American mining industry proceeds with its
deep sea mining operations now. Production at these rates can be sustained
indefinitely, so large are the prolific areas. Over 100 separate deposits of
nodules have been identified in the Pacific Ocean alone.
There is room enough for every nation that can develop the technology as
Americans have done, and that is willing to take the financial risks that
American industry is prepared to do. These risks are very large. A typical
operation will require $200 million to $400 million of capital, divided between
ocean mining and on-shore refining. Some five to ten years' lead time is
required to map a particular deposit, design and manufacture equipment for
that mine site, and design and build a processing plant for those particular ores.
Decisions must be made now.
Conceivably, development of deep seabed minerals might go forward under
one of three legal regimes.
The first would be laissez faire, simply the exercise of the freedom of the seas
under existing international law, without the creation of any new governmental
regulatory machinery. The second would be a treaty. The third would be
reciprocal domestic legislation enacted by the states capable of carrying on deep
seabed mining.
First, as to laissez faire:
The right to mine manganese nodules of the deep seabed, beyond the limits of
the continental margins, is unquestionably one of the freedoms of the high seas,
available to all nations so long as other reasonable uses of the ocean are not
interfered with. While American companies have spent as much as $100 million
to date in exploration and the design and testing of equipment and processes,
they have hesitated to commit themselves to the hundreds of millions more of
expenditures which would be required for full-scale commercial development.
The reason is that the mining industry, unlike the petroleum industry, is not
able to generate all the necessary capital internally, and must borrow heavily to
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go into production of deep seabed minerals. The bankers have testified that they
are prepared to lend the needed money, but first want some assurance, either
through a treaty or domestic legislation, against claim jumping, and, more
important, against the possible retroactive effect of an adverse treaty which
would bring about limitations on production or fixing of prices and markets, or
imposition of prohibitive fees and taxes.
The second possibility, a treaty, is a mixed bag. On the one hand, a treaty
among the dozen or so nations whose nationals have the technical and financial
capability for deep seabed mining might be a very good thing. It presumably
would include limitations on the area to be included in a mining claim, set up an
international registry office to publicize locations and dates of discovery, give
reciprocal recognition to claims formalized in this way, set standards of
diligence to deter speculative claims, and perhaps provide a pool into which
each nation would deposit contributions related to production under its
licenses, for assistance to less-developed countries. Such a treaty-we are still
talking about a good treaty, not the one now being negotiated-could prohibit
price fixing, production controls, and other forms of agreements in restraint of
trade. No elaborate administrative machinery would be required. Let us call this
a consumers' treaty.
Or, on the other hand, we could have the kind of treaty currently being
proposed by the block of 107 nations that dominate the on-going Law of the Sea
negotiations. Their proposals, in various forms, all contain these elements:
First, the creation of a new maritime supergovernment, comprising the three
branches of government-a two-house parliament, consisting of a council of 30
States and an Assembly of all 150 signatories, a Secretariat, and a Tribunal.
Second, vesting in this "apparat" the exclusive authority to carry on deep sea
mining, either directly, or, in its discretion, to do so through contracts with
mining companies, provided that full authority to control operations and
production is retained by the international authority. Various criteria are
stated, including the requirement that the revenues of the land-based mineral-
producing states must be protected. For convenience, we can refer to this as the
anti-consumer concept, or the anti-American treaty. If such a treaty were in
existence, all prospects of deep seabed mining would evaporate. No mining
company, no bank, could put a dime into a venture subject to these hazards.
And the very fact that such a gremlin is trying to move into the neighborhood
will keep investors out until it is exorcised, if that is how one gets rid of grem-
lins. Unfortunately, the American negotiators for six years now have been
cultivating this gremlin instead of chasing it out of town. In 1970 the State
Department offered a draft treaty which proposed a council, a secretariat,
three commissions, and a tribunal, to control deep seabed mining as well as
exploitation of the continental margins. The Group of 107 can say with some
justification that the United States, not they, dredged up this sea monster out of
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Foggy Bottom. And, before leaving the 1970 draft treaty which got us into this
mess, let us remember that it also proposed that all coastal States donate 50 per-
cent to 66 2/3 percent of the government's revenues from the continental margin
beyond the 200-meter depth line to this new international organization.
Naturally, no one else voted for this, but all seized with delight on the idea of the
international parliament, which could control or prevent the achievement of
American hard mineral independence.
Congress gave the Nixon administration advance notice that its 1970 treaty
proposal was not acceptable. On July 21, 1970, the ranking members of the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs wrote the Secretary of State:
In the short time that our members have had access to the sixty-six page draft, the
Subcommittee is unanimous in expressing grave doubts about so many of its
provisions. Therefore, we strongly urge that you prevent its presentation at the United
Nations Seabeds Committee session next week at Geneva, and instead respectfully
suggest that you direct that it be substantially revised.
The reasons, among others:
Various provisions of the draft treaty would establish an international organization
potentially so vast as to make the size of the United Nations pale by comparison. The
organization would include an Assembly, a Council, a Tribunal, three Commissions,
and a Secretariat. Present leasing activities beyond the 200-meter-depth limit could
not generate sufficient revenues to begin to fund such an organization. More impor-
tantly though, considering at best such a massive organization as a possible result of
many concessions in the international negotiating process, one staggers at the thought
of the immensity of the organization which would result from negotiations if the
United States opened discussions by supporting the creation of the monolith con-
tained in the draft treaty.
Despite this warning, the draft treaty was submitted anyhow, with no major
changes.
The deep seabed mining bills now before Congress, five years later, simply go
to show that while the mills of Congress grind slowly, they grind exceedingly
fine. I will come to those bills in a moment.
The earnest and diligent group of American negotiators, who have given the
treaty negotiations a life of its own, remind me of the movie, "The Bridge on the
River Kwai." They have become dedicated to designing and building a top-
heavy power structure-the present writer calls the floating Chinese Pagoda-
that the national interest dictates should never be built at all.
There are, of course, features of the proposed treaty to which the United
States might well agree-for example, freezing territorial sea claims at 12 miles
if unimpeded passage through straits and archipelagos is assured; confirming
the coastal states' limited resource jurisdiction out to 200 miles and no farther;
clarifying pollution control responsibilities and the status of scientific research,
and so on. They are mostly in the nature of self-restraints, as were the four 1958
Geneva conventions. Even if there is no treaty or "family" of treaties, to borrow
Dean Rusk's expression, these concepts, if widely accepted, will pass into
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customary international law. They do not require a new maritime parliament.
Neither does deep sea mining. One can agree with his neighbors that the kids
won't ride bicycles through their flower gardens, without moving a policeman
into the spare bedroom.
And it must be borne in mind that whereas the Assembly of the United
Nations, which has been churning out anti-American resolutions on its
production line, only pretends to be a parliament-to borrow Ambassador
Moynihan's expression-the new seagoing parliament would be a real one, with
power to legislate and to enforce its legislation. It would not be subject to any
veto, its charter would be non-repealable, and indeed the treaty could be
amended by a two-thirds vote of the signatory States at any time to give the new
apparatus more powers. We could and would object to legislation we did not
like, but it would be instant international law; and countries that did not
conform would be international outlaws-or so the anti-American chorus would
happily chant. Why should we do this to ourselves? Why impose new barriers to
American access to vitally needed minerals?
It seems unnecessary to add that the odds against our making believers of the
107 countries that want this anti-American treaty, and converting them to the
cause of writing a consumers' treaty, are exactly 107 to 1. That, coincidentally,
was the vote against us on a resolution in the United Nations Assembly con-
demning our country for its presence in Guam. On that vote, our allies all
abstained.
This was one of a long series of such showdowns, in which a hundred or more
countries, most of them beneficiaries of millions of dollars of American foreign
aid, voted solidly against us. Whatever justification there may have been for the
naivete which prompted the 1970 draft State Department treaty, we should have
grown up by now. As Mr. Moynihan told us, in his article "The United States in
Opposition" in Commentary Magazine (quoting a Chinese statement in 1974):
These days, the United Nations often takes on the appearance of an international
court with the Third World pressing the charges and conducting the trial.
Mr. Moynihan goes on:
Clearly at some level-we all but started the United Nations-there has been a
massive failure of American diplomacy.
He speaks of the
' * ' blind acquiescence and even agreement of the United States which kept en-
dorsing principles for whose logical outcome it was wholly unprepared and with which
it could never actually go along.
This is his crusher, which would be a fitting epitaph for the American Law of
the Sea negotiating policy:
In Washington, three decades of habit and incentive have created patterns of
appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal. Delegations to international
conferences return from devastating defeats proclaiming victory. In truth, these have
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never been thought especially important. Taking seriously a Third World speech
about, say, the right of commodity producers to market their products in concert and
to raise their prices in the process, would have been the mark of the quixotic or the
failed.
Perhaps it is time to take Ambassador Moynihan's advice:
What then does the United States do?
The United States goes into opposition. (His emphasis.)
This, it would seem, is the advice that Congress is about to take.
During the week of March 15, 1976, deep sea mining legislation moved a step
forward in both houses of Congress.
On March 16 the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported favorably H.R. 11879, and on March
18 the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported out S. 713.
The bills differ in several respects, but they have the same purpose and the same
constitutional basis. That basis is the Commerce Clause, the power of Congress
to control the activities of United States nationals and vessels engaged in foreign
commerce on the high seas. Congress does not grant any real estate; no one
owns the deep seabed. The purpose of these bills is to assure continuing
American access to the minerals of the seabed, as a freedom of the seas, and
free of foreign domination, control, or veto. The technique is as follows.
The bills would set up a system of licensing of American individuals and
corporations, and prohibit deep sea mining by such American nationals except
pursuant to a license to be issued under the Act. By this device, Congress would
impose controls, not now existing, on the exercise of the freedom of the seas, but
they are established by an American legislature, not a foreign one. These
controls, among others, would relate to the area to be claimed, diligence require-
ments, environmental safeguards, the obligation to process and refine all
recovered minerals in the United States and to conform to the Jones Act, which
requires transportation in United States vessels. Only United States nationals,
including United States corporations, would be eligible for licenses, but foreign
investments in United States corporations would not disqualify them. The
operation, at sea and on shore, would of course be subject to all applicable
United States laws, including those relating to taxation, anti-trust, export of
strategic minerals, environmental standards, judicial review, and so on.
In return, the United States would recognize the miner's title to the minerals he
recovers and afford his operations diplomatic protection. It would assure him
compensation if the United States should later enter into a treaty which
diminishes his rights or increases his obligations. If commercial insurance
against harassment and claim jumping is not obtainable, the United States, for
appropriate premiums, would provide insurance, comparable to that given
against expropriations on land. The legislation would offer reciprocal treat-
ment to licenses issued by nations that enact similar legislation and which
respect our own government's licenses.
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These movements in Congress should go forward to early enactment. They
state the essential requirements for the recovery of American mineral independ-
ence. The bills are a plain signal to our own negotiators as well as to our
opponents. They run almost exactly counter to the disastrous "single
negotiating text" that came out of the treaty negotiations at Geneva, and
counter to the continuing objectives of the nations that control the negotiations
now in progress. The so-called compromises, the "glimmer of hope," that the
American negotiators have disclosed to Congress in the last few weeks simply
reconfirm these carnivorous objectives.
It is high time for Congress to rescue the executive department from the tar
baby which it helped design and to which it still clings.
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